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Susan N. Houseman
The Debate over the State 
of U.S. Manufacturing
How the Computer Industry Affects the 
Numbers and Perceptions
Since 2000, the U.S. manufacturing 
sector has lost 5.5 million jobs, or 
about a third of its employment base. In 
response to these employment losses, a 
large trade defi cit in manufactured goods, 
and concerns that U.S. manufacturing is 
losing its international competitiveness, 
President Obama recently announced the 
creation of a new cabinet-level Offi ce of 
Manufacturing Policy. 
The administration’s move to develop 
policies promoting U.S. manufacturing 
has many detractors, however. At the heart 
of the debate over the appropriate policy 
response is a basic disagreement over the 
actual state of U.S. manufacturing. Those 
who oppose government intervention 
typically argue there is little need. 
They point to robust output growth 
in manufacturing that, except during 
recessions, has outpaced average annual 
growth of the U.S. economy for decades. 
Employment losses, it is argued, are 
largely a consequence of extraordinary 
productivity growth, which in turn refl ects 
automation, not import competition. The 
U.S. manufacturing sector is healthy, 
according to this view. There is little or 
nothing to fi x.1 
The purpose of this article is to help 
reconcile the apparently contradictory 
sets of statistics that are brought to the 
debate. In particular, I argue that the 
aggregate manufacturing output and 
productivity statistics so commonly cited 
are widely misinterpreted. 
Aggregate statistics mask quite 
divergent trends within manufacturing. 
The rapid output and productivity 
growth of the manufacturing sector is 
largely attributable to one small industry: 
computers and electronic products. 
For most of manufacturing, output 
growth has been relatively weak and 
productivity growth modest. In addition, 
the extraordinary output growth in the 
U.S. computer industry does not signal 
U.S. competitiveness in manufacturing 
computer and electronic products, and 
productivity growth has not caused 
the steep employment declines in this 
industry. 
Different Statistics 
Paint Different Pictures
Output statistics such as those 
depicted in Figure 1 paint a rosy picture 
of the U.S. manufacturing sector. The 
fi gure, which plots indexes of real (price-
adjusted) GDP and manufacturing value 
added from 1997 to 2011, shows that, 
except during recessions, growth in 
manufacturing real value added outpaced 
growth in real GDP. Over the entire time 
period, manufacturing output growth was 
greater than that of GDP. 
In spite of its strong output growth, 
manufacturing employment has been 
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Figure 2  Manufacturing Employment, Number and as Percent of Nonfarm Payroll 
Employment, 1970-2011 
declining as a share of nonfarm payroll 
employment since the 1970s (Figure 2). 
The divergent output and employment 
trends are typically explained by the 
fact that labor productivity growth in 
manufacturing has also greatly outpaced 
that in the aggregate economy. From 
this perspective, recent employment 
declines in manufacturing seem part of 
a long-term trend. Numerous analysts 
have made analogies between the 
manufacturing sector and agriculture, 
which has experienced high output 
growth, but supports few jobs owing 
to the automation of farming. (See, for 
example, Reich [2009], Executive Offi ce 
of the President [2009], and Roxburgh et 
al. [2012].) 
A closer look at the manufacturing 
employment numbers, however, reveals 
a clear break in trend since 2000. Figure 
2, which also plots manufacturing 
employment levels from 1970 to the 
present, shows that manufacturing 
employment was relatively stable or 
experienced modest trend declines until 
2000.2 From 2000 to 2002 manufacturing 
employment fell by 2 million, or 12 
percent, and during the ensuing economic 
upturn, manufacturing employment 
continued to fall; this marked the fi rst 
time manufacturing employment failed to 
rebound following a recession. Over the 
decade from 2000 to 2010, manufacturing 
employment declined by 5.7 million, 
or one-third. The sudden and sharp 
employment losses in the manufacturing 
sector are hard to fully square with a 
story about productivity improvements 
driven by automation. And although press 
reports have heralded manufacturing’s 
employment gains in the last year, they 
are small compared to its losses during 
the Great Recession. Today, nonfarm 
payroll employment is 96 percent of what 
it was in 2007, immediately prior to the 
start of the recession; manufacturing 
employment is just 87 percent.
Trade statistics also give cause 
for concern about the state of U.S. 
manufacturing. Eighteen of the 19 
industries in the manufacturing sector run 
sizable trade defi cits, according to data 
published by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis; that is, the United States 
imports more than it exports in these 
industries’ product categories. Moreover, 
between 1998 (the fi rst year that these 
industry-level data are published) and 
2007, the ratio of net exports (exports less 
imports) to domestic use of an industry’s 
products worsened. This implies that 
domestic manufacturing output failed 
to keep pace with domestic use of 
manufactured goods. The picture has 
been more mixed since 2007, refl ecting 
the worldwide recession, but apparel, 
textiles, furniture, autos, electrical 
appliances, and computers continued to 
show a loss of competitiveness by this 
metric.
What Accounts for Manufacturing’s 
High Output Growth? 
Manufacturing’s strong growth in 
real value added seems at odds with 
the weak employment numbers and 
trade performance. These apparently 
Figure 1  Growth in Real GDP and Manufacturing Value Added, 1997–2011
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contradictory trends can be reconciled 
to a large degree by the fact that the 
manufacturing output statistics mask 
divergent trends within the manufacturing 
sector. 
Figure 3 shows average annual growth 
in real value added for the computers 
and electronic products industry and for 
manufacturing excluding the computer 
industry from 1997 to 2007 (the decade 
leading up to the Great Recession) 
and from 2000 to 2010 (a period that 
incorporates the recession). Real value 
added in the computer industry grew at 
a staggering rate of 22 percent per year 
from 1997 to 2007 and 16 percent per 
year from 2000 to 2010. In contrast, 
average annual growth of real value 
added in the rest of manufacturing was 
just 1.2 percent per year from 1997 to 
2007; real value added in the rest of 
manufacturing was actually about 6 
percent lower in 2010 than at the start of 
the decade. 
Although the computer and electronics 
products industry only accounted for 
10–12 percent of value added in the 
manufacturing sector throughout the 
period, it has an outsized effect on 
aggregate manufacturing statistics. 
Without the computer industry, 
manufacturing real value-added growth 
has been much weaker than overall 
growth in the economy (Figure 4).3 The 
computer industry has a similarly large 
impact on the aggregate manufacturing 
productivity statistics. For example, 
manufacturing multifactor productivity 
growth rates between 1997 and 2007 
fall by almost half when the computer 
industry is excluded (Houseman et al. 
2011).
The growth rates in Figures 3 and 
4 are based on published data. In 
addition, the sizable growth of imported 
intermediates used in manufacturing has 
likely imparted a signifi cant bias to real 
value added in the published statistics 
for all manufacturing industries. This 
bias arises because the price declines 
associated with the shift in sourcing 
to low-cost countries are not properly 
captured, which in turn results in an 
underestimation of the real growth in 
imports and an overestimation of the 
growth in real value added produced 
domestically. Accounting for offshoring 
bias, the average annual growth rate 
in real value added for manufacturing 
excluding computers was well under 
1 percent between 1997 and 2007 
(Houseman et al. 2011).
What Accounts for the Extraordinary 
Growth in Real Value Added and 
Productivity in the Computer Industry 
and What Does It Mean?
Is the computer and electronic 
products industry, which includes 
computers, semiconductors, and 
telecommunications equipment, the 
bright spot in American manufacturing? 
Not necessarily. Although some computer 
and electronics products companies 
headquartered in the United States are 
highly successful in product innovation 
and are competitive in international 
markets, the United States does not 
produce high-volume products in 
this industry anymore (Sturgeon and 
Kawakami 2010). And trade statistics 
cited above indicate that domestic 
production has not kept pace with 
consumption, leading to a widening trade 
defi cit in these products.
What accounts then for the rapid 
growth in real value added in this 
industry? At least part of the explanation 
concerns the adjustment of price 
indexes used to defl ate computers and 
semiconductors for improvements in 
quality. Computers and semiconductors 
are much more powerful today than they 
were a decade or even a year or two ago. 
Although product price indexes typically 
increase over time, for computers 
and semiconductors they have fallen 
rapidly. Largely refl ecting adjustments 
by statistical agencies to account for 
the increased power of computers and 
semiconductors, the price indexes used 
to adjust shipments of computers and 
semiconductors have fallen at a rate 
of 21 percent and 13 percent per year, 
respectively, from 1998 to 2010. Such 
rapid price drops imply, for example, that 
for the same dollar value of computer 
shipments, the quality-adjusted quantity 
(real value) is 13 times higher in 2010 
than in 1998.4
The rapid growth in real output 
coupled with a sharp drop in employment 
has led to surging productivity in the 
computer industry. But has productivity 
Figure 3  Average Annual Growth 
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growth caused these employment 
declines? Analysts often interpret 
productivity growth to mean that workers 
are working faster or that automation 
(the substitution of capital for labor) 
is driving the growth, as illustrated 
in a recent White House report on 
manufacturing: “Manufacturing workers 
have paradoxically often been the victims 
of their sector’s own success, as rapid 
productivity growth has meant that goods 
can be produced with fewer workers” 
(Executive Offi ce of the President 2009).
Underpinning the computer industry’s 
rapid productivity growth, however, are 
price defl ators that, when adjusted for 
quality improvements, are rapidly falling. 
The productivity growth in the computer 
industry largely refl ects research and 
development innovations, and product 
improvements do not cause job losses. 
Today’s computer may be in some 
statistical sense the equivalent of, say, 13 
computers in 1998, but that does not, in 
and of itself, mean that fewer workers are 
needed to manufacture a computer today 
than in the past. In fact, job losses in the 
computer industry are attributable to the 
shift of electronics product manufacturing 
to Asia (see, for example, Roxburgh et al. 
2012). 
Conclusion 
Strong output and productivity 
statistics have led many to dismiss out-
of-hand concerns about the international 
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing. 
The computer and electronics products 
industry, however, is driving these high 
growth rates in the aggregate statistics, 
despite the fact that this industry accounts 
for only about 10 percent of the sector’s 
value added and employment. The 
irony is that high output growth in the 
computer industry is a poor metric of 
the competitiveness of U.S. factories in 
making computer and related electronic 
products. The manufacturing of these 
products has largely moved to Asia. 
Competition from foreign suppliers, not 
high productivity growth, is responsible 
for the sharp employment declines in the 
computer industry.
Understanding the international 
competitiveness of manufacturing and 
the consequences of import competition 
for workers and businesses is critical for 
developing sound manufacturing policy. 
As a start, analysts and policymakers 
should recognize that the aggregate 
output and productivity statistics are not 
representative of what is happening in 
most of manufacturing. 
Notes
1.  See, for example, Kevin Hasset, http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16/
obama-s-obsession-drives-progress-in-
reverse-commentary-by-kevin-hassett.html 
and Mark J. Perry, http://blog.american.
com/2012/02/u-s-manufacturing-is-already-
doing-remarkably-well-without-taxpayer-
help/. Atkinson et al. (2012, pp. 24–25) 
includes citations to many other prominent 
analysts and policymakers promoting this 
view. 
2.  The modest declines in manufacturing 
employment during the 1990s can be 
accounted for entirely by manufacturers’ 
increased use of staffi ng industry workers, 
who are not counted as manufacturing 
employees. Although in offi cial statistics 
manufacturing employment declined by 
4.1 percent from 1989 to 2000, taking 
into account temporary help and other 
staffi ng workers assigned to manufacturing, 
employment rose by an estimated 1.3 percent 
(Dey, Houseman, and Polivka forthcoming). 
3.  The reason this fact is not more widely 
known may have to do with the way the 
statistics are published. In the late 1990s, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, along with 
the other U.S. statistical agencies, introduced 
the use of chained aggregates. Although 
BEA publishes value added in “real chained 
dollars” for all individual manufacturing 
industries, these industry-level real chained 
dollars cannot be summed to create a real 
series for subsets of industries. Growth rates 
for industry subsets may be approximated 
using a Törnqvist formula that uses both 
real and nominal value-added industry data. 
Specifi cally, the growth rate of real value-
added for a subset of industries, expressed as 
a logarithmic change, is approximately equal 
to the weighted average of the growth rates of 
the component industries,  
ln 1 , , , 1( / ) ln( / )t t i t i t i t
i
Q Q w q q? ???
where qi,t is the published real dollar or 
(equivalently) quantity index for industry i 
in year t and wi,t is the average of industry i’s 
share of nominal value added in adjacent time 
periods (t, t − 1); 
i
?wit = 1.
4.  The statistics for the computer and 
electronics products industry also may be 
subject to signifi cant measurement error, in 
addition to that discussed above. This industry 
has been characterized by rapid shifts in the 
sourcing of production and the development 
of global production chains that are diffi cult to 
capture in our statistical system, as currently 
designed. Such measurement error is the 
subject of on-going research supported by a 
Sloan Foundation grant that I am codirecting. 
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This article summarizes fi ndings from a recent 
issue brief on Employer Resource Networks 
(Timmeney and Hollenbeck 2012). 
Employer Resource Networks 
(ERNs) evolved in western Michigan 
over the last 10 years in response 
to business owners’ concerns about 
the retention and skill levels of their 
workforces. These business owners have 
realized that recruitment and retention 
of a qualifi ed workforce are central 
ingredients for organizational success. 
Out of these concerns arose consortia of 
businesses that leverage resources for 
the benefi t of the member businesses, 
their employees, and for the communities 
where the businesses operate. The goals 
of these ERNs are to provide sustainable 
employment throughout all segments 
of the workforce by effi ciently utilizing 
community supports, and help under- and 
unemployed residents of the community 
maintain employment and move into 
economic self-suffi ciency.
These networks have been particularly 
successful with small and midsized 
fi rms that pool resources to accomplish 
together what they cannot accomplish 
individually. The distinguishing feature 
of each ERN is that participating 
businesses pay membership fees that are 
used to fund a case manager—referred to 
by ERN members as a “success coach”—
from the public human services system 
to locate on-site at each business or in a 
central location. 
Participating employers expect to 
experience lower turnover rates and 
lower consequent hiring costs, reduced 
expenses and hassles associated with 
worker tardiness and absenteeism, and 
improved productivity. These benefi ts are 
expected as workers, facilitated in many 
cases by the success coach, are better able 
to focus on their work activity and stay 
on the job longer. Employers also expect 
some cost savings related to training and 
worker skill development through this 
consortium approach to human resource 
support and services.
This article presents the results from a 
survey that was conducted to determine 
the components necessary to form a 
successful ERN. Thirteen representatives 
from six west Michigan ERNs were 
interviewed to gather evidence refl ecting 
on seven issues that emerged from 
a study contrasting the launch and 
operations of two of the six ERNs 
during the fall of 2010. (See Hollenbeck, 
Erickcek, and Timmeney 2011). 
The survey respondents were 
purposively chosen and, for the most 
part, were ardent supporters of ERNs at 
participating fi rms. Of those interviewed, 
two were company owners and the 
remaining were all vice presidents 
of human resources (HR) within the 
participating fi rms. The length of time 
that the ERNs had existed ranged from 
the conceptual stage in two sites to 
nearly 10 years at one of the sites. These 
particular respondents allow us to address 
seven questions about what works in 
forming a successful ERN through the 
perspectives of advocates who have 
diligently committed to the concept. 
1) Is the size of the ERN important 
for success?
The ERNs represented by the 
interviewees ranged in membership size 
from 5 to 17 employers. Respondents 
confi rmed our hypothesis that fewer 
than 5 employers may not be a viable 
number of fi rms for an ERN. They said 
that the minimum number of employers 
needed to create group synergy and cost 
effectiveness was 5–6, and emphasized 
that an ERN’s optimal size depends on 
the number of employees at the fi rm and 
service usage amongst each of the fi rms.
Scale is important because it 
determines the individual fi rm’s fi nancial 
contribution to the consortium, and 
because governance and operation of 
the initiative requires the employers’ 
investment of time and energy. The 
average employment level per fi rm in 
this study was approximately 75–100 
employees (some ERNs included fi rms 
with much larger employment levels). 
Using this average employment level per 
fi rm and the minimum number of fi rms 
per ERN, the scale of employment at 
member fi rms must be at least 375–600. 
However, further variables must be 
considered when determining ERN size. 
Optimal scale must include a balance 
of considerations such as the number of 
employees receiving welfare assistance, 
fi rm size, utilization of services, 
geographic location and expanse of 
member fi rms, and industry mix. 
An issue closely related to scale is 
the fee structure of the ERN. Should 
fees be based on employment levels or 
utilization, or should there be a fl at fee 
for all members? Utilization level was 
used by only one of the ERNs as the 
method for calculating fee structure. 
Representatives from other ERNs 
believed strongly that a fl at fee is a more 
useful method. Utilization can vary 
signifi cantly from year to year, and a 
varying fee means that costs must be 
argued for yearly with the CEO or upper-
level management. Equal funding or a 
fl at fee applied across all fi rms is easier 
to budget for and lessens the need for 
annual advocacy for participation. Some 
respondents also believed that under a 
utilization fee structure, fi rms with higher 
utilization, by right of paying higher fees, 
have more say in programming or design 
discussions, whereas a fl at fee levels the 
Bridget Timmeney and Kevin Hollenbeck
What Works in Forming 
a Successful Employer 
Resource Network? 
In all of the interviews where 
the ERN was fully operational, 
the respondents believed 
that there were individuals 
whose jobs had been saved 
because of ERN intervention. 
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playing fi eld for the smaller or midsized 
fi rms.
2) How do ERNs fare during 
a recession?
During the recent recession, fi rms 
were laying off substantial shares of their 
workforces. Some fi rms may be hesitant 
to invest in an ERN because of concerns 
about business or economic downturns. 
Even though ERNs exist to improve 
worker retention and skill building, in 
the recent recession, the respondents 
confi rmed that ERNs still provided 
value in retention and recruitment. 
Success coaches dealt with situations in 
which family members other than the 
worker were laid off. Furthermore, when 
possible, networking HR managers in 
the ERNs assisted each other in placing 
workers who were laid off. Not only 
did the success coaches provide value 
to the fi rms and employees, the HR 
managers and fi rms reaped the benefi ts 
of the network of HR knowledge and 
connections.
3) Is it important to have 
sectoral diversity?
The existing ERNs have members 
from across a spectrum of industries. 
Respondents indicated that this enhanced 
the sharing of experiences and policies. 
Furthermore, the diversifi cation 
dampened the effect of the business cycle 
as some fi rms had stable employment 
levels over the cycle and others 
fl uctuated. A health care collaborative 
did emerge and functioned well, but 
coincidentally has merged with another 
nearby multisector network in an effort to 
streamline network coordination costs.
4) Can ERNs succeed if member fi rms 
are not located near each other?
The neighborhood model of an ERN 
has many advantages, but most of the 
individuals interviewed in this study 
were in ERNs that covered fairly wide 
geography. The trade-off for the latter 
is that these ERNs must achieve scale, 
but they must also operate within an 
area that can be effi ciently served by 
a success coach. An ERN located in a 
small geographic area is most likely to be 
successful in a larger metropolitan area 
with a concentration of fi rms. 
5) Are ERNs more successful if they 
have ties to other ERNs?
The achievements and energy of an 
ERN seem to be enhanced if it has ties 
to another ERN. The growth and success 
of four of the ERNs were somewhat 
dependent on the spillover in awareness 
from the original two ERNs’ experience 
and successes. Conversely, the demise of 
the one ERN no longer in existence can 
be partially attributed to a “cold” start. 
In that case, none of the participating 
fi rms had had any experience with an 
ERN. Rather, the fi rms that joined the 
initiative committed to participate based 
on evidence presented to them about the 
success of other ERNs. 
In contrast, many of the health care 
fi rms in other successful ERNs have 
an industry connection, and several of 
the manufacturers have employed vice 
presidents of human resources that were 
previously employed in HR at founding 
member companies of the original ERN. 
The fi ve representatives interviewed 
from the ERNs in the start-up phase 
all indicated that their knowledge and 
contacts with HR professionals at the 
operational ERNs were instrumental in 
their explorations of the feasibility and 
subsequent commitment to participation 
in their local ERNs. These interactions 
depict yet another networking benefi t of 
ERNs versus starting from scratch.
6) What are the roles of HR managers 
and other upper-level management/
owners in successful ERNs? 
Clearly an investment in an ERN 
requires CEO or upper-management 
approval, and thus they are the targets 
of marketing efforts, which may come 
from an internal source—usually the vice 
president of HR—or from other CEOs or 
management. Once upper-level managers 
decide to participate, however, they 
typically do not participate in the ERN. 
The interviews confi rmed that ERNs 
exemplify the importance of aligning 
incentives. The HR representatives 
interviewed all indicated that their jobs 
were made easier with the availability of 
a success coach, who improved employee 
retention and, in many cases, offered 
valuable training. The respondents 
reported that the benefi ts of participation 
clearly outweighed the fees paid by the 
fi rm for participation. Without an ERN, 
the fi rms would have had to rely on 
their own resources to address employee 
performance or attendance issues, usually 
without clear knowledge or time to 
address the possible underlying causes. A 
success coach is specifi cally trained and 
can offer years of experience with this 
base of knowledge. 
In all of the interviews where the ERN 
was fully operational, the respondents 
believed that there were individuals 
whose jobs had been saved because of 
ERN intervention. They said that ERN 
participation had saved the fi rm the 
costs of terminating these employees, 
recruiting replacements, and training the 
new hires. Since employee participation 
and service provision are confi dential, 
the HR staff members do not know who 
is served or the specifi c services they 
have been provided. However, the survey 
respondents indicated that transportation 
was the primary need that was addressed, 
along with auto repair, fi nancial help, and 
assistance with food and utilities. 
Two HR managers interviewed 
independently commented that the ERN 
model offered a concrete way to engage 
in the workforce development system. 
They found the model to be mutually 
benefi cial to their fi rms and their workers 
as well as a means to contribute to the 
local human services delivery systems. 
This aspect of the ERN concept was also 
a tool that these HR managers used to 
sell participation and the associated fee to 
upper management.
7) What are the networking advantages 
of ERNs?
As with any business start up, ERNs 
have a business plan to guide their 
development. As the ERN moves from 
a group of interested fi rms convening 
around the concept to the stage of 
launching and implementation, these 
business plans are developed by the 
founding members of the ERN. Close 
relationships develop between the 
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participants, especially when they share 
the common role of HR professional 
in their fi rms. It is through this process 
that the governing group becomes a 
resource for networking. 
Each of the respondents commented 
that networking, regardless of industry 
representation or geographic proximity, 
serves as a valuable function of the 
ERN. The ERNs meet on at least a 
quarterly basis, but communication 
occurs frequently in between meetings. 
In person, or more often by phone, 
representatives share practical 
experience on issues such as how to 
control costs, how to adjust to a new 
personnel policy, or mutual training 
needs. An issue that was a primary 
barrier in all fi rms was communicating 
to all employees the services available 
from the success coach. Through the 
networking, ERN supporters shared 
ideas on how to successfully market 
the ERN within their organizations. 
Ultimately, it was during these regular 
discussions that participating fi rms 
learned how they could potentially 
share services that facilitate the 
implementation of the business plan 
and enable the ERN to thrive.
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